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Player violence, or violent players? Vicarious liability for 
sports participants
Mark James* and David McArdle**
This article analyses two recent English cases concerning the law on  
vicarious liability for acts of violence and considers their significance in  
respect of on-field acts of violence in sports participation.  It provides an  
overview of how the law of negligence has developed in the specific context  
of sports injuries (including application of the volenti principle) and critiques  
the application of vicarious liability to sports cases.  This is followed by a  
consideration of the wider law on vicarious liability for violent employees  
through a review of Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215 and deeper  
consideration of Mattis v Pollock [2003] IRLR 603 (which has to date been the  
subject of little, if any, academic comment).  The article continues with an  
analysis of how those decisions have changed the legal landscape in respect  
of violent sports participants, looking in particular at reported cases from 
three jurisdictions in which that issue has been raised.
INTRODUCTION
Some of the cases that form the starting-point for this article, particularly Lister v Hesley 
Hall Ltd [2002] 1 AC 215 (Lister), have already attracted their share of academic comment1 
and the authors hope to contribute to those discussions by considering the potential 
application of the laws on vicarious liability to situations in which their relevance may not be 
immediately apparent.  This article therefore draws upon the authors’ earlier work on liability 
for negligent acts on the sports field2 and on vicarious liability generally3 to consider the 
future of vicarious liability in the context of sports participation.  The concern is not so much 
1*Senior Lecturer in Law, Manchester Metropolitan University.
**Lecturer in Law, Aberdeen Business School.  The authors would like to thank Walter Cairns for his 
help and guidance regarding French law, but any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors.
Loubser, M and Reid E, “Vicarious Liability for Intentional Wrongdoing After Lister and Dubai Aluminium 
in Scotland and South Africa” [2003] Jurid Rev 143; McBride N, “Vicarious Liability in England and 
Australia” [2003] CLJ 255. 
2 James M and Delley F, “The Standard of Care in Sports Negligence Cases” [2002] 1 Entertainment 
Law 104; James M, “Tort, Compensation and Alternative Dispute Resolution for Participator Violence” in 
Gardiner S et al, Sports Law (2nd ed, Cavendish Publishing, London, 2001) Ch 16.
3 McArdle D, “His Master’s Vice.  Vicarious Liability for the Acts of Violent Employees after Lister” 
(2003) 1 Journal of Obligations and Remedies 41.
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with liability for violent acts per se, but with liability in respect of injuries inflicted by 
individuals who may be regarded as having a propensity for acts of violence, by virtue of 
their behavior in sporting or in other contexts.  As the title of the article infers, the concern is 
with violent people who are allowed to participate in professional sports, rather than with 
professional sports participants who commit acts of violence on the field of play.  A 
propensity for violence could now result in sports employers being vicariously liable for acts 
that, prior to Lister and Mattis v Pollock (t/as Flamingo’s Nightclub) [2003] IRLR 603 (Mattis), 
would have seen only personal liability arising on the ground that those acts were not 
committed “in the course of employment”.
The House of Lords decision in Lister effectively redefined the scope of vicarious liability at 
common law.  So far as tortious acts in sport are concerned, it has given new impetus to the 
truism that the law of the land does not stop at the touchline.  Lister shifts the boundaries of 
the potential liability of professional sports clubs for the injury-causing acts of their violent 
employees.  This article examines not only the scope of a club’s liability for negligently 
inflicted on-the-ball injuries but also its potential liability for deliberately inflicted harm and 
off-the-ball incidents, establishing the extent to which an employer club is vicariously liable 
for the acts of its violent players.  That done, the “Roy Keane Affair” and decisions from 
courts in Australia, the United States and France are discussed in order to lend weight to the 
assertion that English law would not be out-of-step were it to extend liability for the on-field 
activities of violent sports employees to the employing organizations.
Before considering vicarious liability for the activities of violent participants it is appropriate 
to clarify the extent to which the defence of volenti is applicable in sports negligence cases. 
It is a truism that a risk of injury is inherent within most sports, the degree of risk being 
particularly high in collision sports such as rugby and boxing, less so in contact sports like 
netball and soccer, and less still in non-contact sports like tennis, bowls or archery.  As 
Barwick CJ stated in Rootes v Shelton (1968) 116 CLR 383 at 385, “by engaging in a sport …. 
the participants may be held to have accepted risks which are inherent in that sport”.  The 
complications that arise for sports participants are the combined issues of consent and 
volenti non fit injuria, or the implied assumption of risks.4 However, consent and volenti have 
had very little impact on the majority of sports cases.  Consent operates as a defence only to 
the international tort of battery.  In the sporting context, players consent to intentional acts 
that are an integral part of the playing of the game, for example a tackle in a game of rugby, 
or being punched in a boxing contest.5 It has even been held that “a frequent or familiar 
4 Adams M, “Volenti Non fit Injuria or Contributory Negligence? A Comparative Review of Three 
Football Cases” (1994) 2 E Rev PL 329.  From a practical perspective, by participating in a sport, the 
injured individual can be said to have either impliedly consented to all contacts that are an integral 
part of the playing of the game or to have voluntarily run the ordinary risks that are an inherent part of 
the playing of that sport.  This implied consent ensures that those who cause injury to other 
participants during the course of a lawful sport cannot be liable for the injuries that result from the 
contacts that are a necessary and inherent part of the playing of the game, or are within the accepted 
playing culture of the sport, as partially defined in Caldwell v Maguire [2001] EWCA Civ 1054 
(discussed in the conclusion below).
5 Watson v British Boxing Board of Control [2001] QB 1134.
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infraction of the rules of a game can fall within the ordinary risks of the game accepted by 
all the participants.”6 It is, therefore, only deliberate contacts that have nothing to do with 
the playing of the game, such as fighting, that will fall outside of the scope of consent.
Volenti non fit injuria operates as defence to a claim of negligence only when a duty of care, 
its breach and consequent damage have all been established.  As sports participants run the 
risk of, for example, being tackled in rugby or soccer games or charged in ice hockey, 
volenti, as the legal embodiment of risk taking, seems to be the appropriate defence. 
However, the majority of sports negligence cases turn on the issue of breach of duty rather 
than the need to establish a defence to a fully made out claim of negligence.  Unless and 
until a claim of negligence is fully made out, the issue of volenti will not arise.  To date, the 
reported cases have all turned on whether the act of the defendant fell below the standard 
of care expected of a reasonable player in that game.  If a sports participant is found not to 
have acted negligently, no issue of volenti will arise.  However in cases where a sports 
participant has been found to have acted negligently, it has been because such play was 
unreasonable and/or unexpected.  Again, no issue of volenti has arisen because participants 
consent to, or are volens to, only such acts as can be reasonable expected from a player 
playing according to the reasonably accepted standard of play.  Thus, volenti has had no 
impact on the vast majority of sports negligence cases.
SPORTS, TORTS AND THE COURTS
Condon v Basi [1985] 1 WLR 866, based on a late tackle in a football game, was the first 
case on tortious liability for player-on-player acts of violence to be heard by the courts in the 
United Kingdom.  Since this case was heard by the Court of Appeal in 1985, there has been a 
dramatic increase in the pool of potential defendants against whom an injured sports 
participant can bring a claim.  Players can sue other players,7 the referee,8 coaches9 and 
governing bodies.10 However, from the perspective of the professional sports participant, the 
most important potential defendant is the club which employs the player who caused their 
6 Matteson v Governors of Dalhusey University and College (1983) 57 NSR (2nd) 56, quoted in Elliott v 
Saunders and Liverpool Football Club (unreported, Eng High Ct, 10 June 1994), transcript p 7.
7 McCord v Carnforth and Swansea City AFC Ltd, The Times, 11 February 1997.
8 Smolden v Whitworth (1997) PIQR 133.
9 Canterbury Bankstown Rugby League Football Club Ltd v Rogers; Bugden v Rogers [1993] Aust Tort 
Reports 81-246.
10 Watson v British Boxing Board of Control [2001] QB 1134.
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injury.  In English law, bringing an action against a club for an employee’s act of negligence 
has been relatively uncontroversial and the advantage of a successful vicarious liability 
claim is that it enables the injured player to receive compensation from the defendant club’s 
employer’s liability insurance.  By contrast, a successful personal claim against the 
defendant may simply result in damages being awarded against an archetypal “man of 
straw” against whom only a pyrrhic victory could be secured.  In the main reported cases, 
there has been remarkably little discussion of vicarious liability, either because no 
employment relationship exists or, where professional players are concerned, because 
vicarious liability has not been contested by the defendant employer.  On almost every 
occasion the club has accepted that the defendant player was in some way carrying out 
actions that were authorised by their employing club.  Although the injuries were inflicted by 
acts of foul play, these have been considered to be acts authorised by the employer as an 
integral and accepted means of playing the game.  At worst, they have been regarded as 
unauthorised means, foul tackles, of carrying out authorised acts, namely challenges for 
possession of the ball. 
Only in the submissions relating to costs in Elliott v Saunders and Liverpool Football Club 
(unreported, English High Court, 10 June 1994) was the relationship between the defendant 
player and his club discussed any further.  Here it was considered that separate 
representation would be required for player and club where they were either sued 
separately, as was the case here, or where there was an allegation of battery by the 
defendant club (transcript p 36).  In other words, there was a contention in Elliott that if the 
injurious act of the defendant player were trespassory in nature, it would be regarded as an 
act unauthorised by the employer and vicarious liability would not therefore attach.  It is this 
aspect of vicarious liability that is examined here, drawing upon the more recent decisions to 
consider the extent to which this contention has merit.
SPORT AND NEGLIGENCE
The development and application of the law of negligence to sports injury cases is a 
relatively recent phenomenon.  When Condon v Basi [1985] 1 WLR 866 reached the Court of 
Appeal, Lord Donaldson MR noted (at 867):
It is said that there is no authority as to what is the standard of care which covers the 
conduct of players [of] competitive sport[s] whose rules and general background 
contemplate …. physical contact between the players.  This is somewhat surprising 
but appears to be the position. 
The court determined that liability should be imposed upon the defendant footballer who 
had broken the leg of the claimant by means of a foul tackle for which he was sent off.  The 
Court of Appeal based its judgment on the reasoning of Kitto J in Rootes v Shelton (1968) 
116 CLR 383, holding that there was a general standard of care placing all sports 
participants under a duty to take all reasonable care to avoid causing injury to co-
participants, taking account of the circumstances in which the acts take place.  Lord 
Donaldson pointed out (at 867) that there are markedly different circumstances to be taken 
into account when considering liability arising from a football game and a walk in the 
countryside and approved of Kitto J’s assertion in Rootes (at 390) that the rules, conventions 
and customs of a sport or game may be relevant circumstances to be taken into account. 
Unfortunately, Lord Donaldson did not make any attempt at defining further the standard of 
care to be applied in sports negligence cases.  After nearly 10 years of debate over the 
precise nature of the test to be applied, the standard eventually settled on by the court was 
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confirmed in Caldwell v Maguire [2001] EWCA Civ 1054, a case arising out of injuries caused 
by the careless riding of a professional jockey during a race, as that of negligence in all the 
circumstances.11 Thus, all sports participants owe a duty to take all reasonable care not to 
cause injury to one another whilst playing their sport.
The main question for the court will be whether the duty to take care has been breached in 
the specific circumstances in which the injury occurred.  The relevant circumstances derive 
from the specific game that was being played.12 In particular, both the rules and the playing 
culture of the sport are of paramount importance in determining the legality of the contract. 
If the contract is found to be acceptable, there is no breach of the duty and no liability; if it is 
unacceptable, then the defendant player is liable in negligence.
APPLYING VICARIOUS LIABILITY TO SPORTS NEGLIGENCE CASES
Nine years after Condon, the English High Court in Elliott v Saunders and Liverpool Football  
Club (unreported, English High Court, 10 June 1994) accepted that in principle a professional 
football club could be vicariously liable for the acts of its employees who negligently caused 
injury to another player, although the case failed on the facts.  Less than two years later, in 
McCord v Cornforth and Swansea City Football Club (The Times, 11 February 1997) the High 
Court finally found an employing club vicariously liable for the acts of an employee player 
and awarded damages to a professional footballer whose playing career had been ended by 
the negligent challenge of an opponent.  Although there is a long and detailed discussion of 
the evidence and of the standard of care to be applied in sports negligence cases, no 
mention is made of the issue of vicarious liability in the judgment.
Since McCord there has been very little consideration of vicarious liability in the reported 
cases, all of which have involved foul challenges committed in circumstances where 
vicarious liability has undoubtedly attached.  Indeed, the application of vicarious liability has 
been so clear-cut that defendant clubs have not even tried to argue to the contrary.  In 
Watson and Bradford City Football Club v Gray and Huddersfield Town Football Club (The 
Times, 26 November 1998), the defendant club was found vicariously liable to the claimant 
for a career-interrupting, rather than a career-ending, injury while in Vowles v Evans and 
Welsh Rugby Union [2003] EWCA Civ 318, the Welsh Rugby Union was held to be vicariously 
liable for the negligent non-application of the safety rules of rugby by one of its appointed 
referees.   These developments aside, so non-contentious have the reported cases been that 
in the most recent cases of this nature, Pitcher v Huddersfield Town Football Club (2001) WL 
753397 and Gaynor v Blackpool Football Club [2002] CLY 3280; (2002) WL 1039724, the 
defendant player was not even joined as a party to the proceedings.  The assumption has 
been that if negligence is found, the club alone would be liable in damages.
11 See James and Deeley, n 2, and more detailed discussion in the conclusion.
12 This should be contrasted with Cox N, “Civil Liability for Foul Play in Sport” (2003) 54 NILQ 351. 
Cox puts forward a contrary argument that a duty only arises where the injurious act is not consented 
to.  In the light of Caldwell, this must be incorrect.  A duty is imposed upon all players at all times; it is 
simply not breached unless the contract falls below the standard of care relevant to that sport and/or is 
not consented to.
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Taken as a whole, the cases are authority for the proposition either that the negligent, and 
usually foul, play of the defendant player will be considered to be authorised by the 
defendant club because of its integral connection with the player’s employment by the club, 
or alternatively, that the injury-causing acts are an unauthorised means of performing an act 
authorised by the employing club as being a necessary part of the performance of the job. 
However, all these cases arise from foul play that either occurred on the ball or in such close 
connection to the play as to be considered by the court to be an integral part of the game. 
What has not yet been discussed in the courts of the United Kingdom is whether a club can 
be liable for the violent acts of its players in other circumstances, particularly those in which 
the link between the employment and the act of violence is not so clear-cut.  In the wake of 
Lister it is arguable that violent acts which would have previously resulted in civil, and 
perhaps even criminal, liability,13 attaching upon the violent player alone can now result in 
liability vicariously attaching to the employer as well.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ENGLISH LAW
In order to consider the potential scope of a professional sports club’s vicarious liability, it is 
necessary to consider the House of Lords decision in Lister v Hesley Hall Ltd and that of the 
Court of Appeal in Mattis v Pollock.  Lister arose as a consequence of the paedophile 
activities of an employee (Grain) of Hesley Hall Ltd, a company that owned and ran a boys’ 
residential care home.  The employee acted as warden of the care home and was 
responsible for the day-to-day running of the premises and for maintaining discipline.  Some 
of those abused by Grain sought damages for personal injury on the ground that the 
company was vicariously liable for the torts committed by him.  The House of Lords, 
overruling the Court of Appeal’s ruling in Trotman v North Yorkshire Country Council [1999] 
IRLR 98, noted that employers have an opportunity and, indeed, a responsibility to recruit, 
train, supervise and, if necessary, take disciplinary action.  Lister affirms that employers who 
fail to discharge their responsibility cannot avoid liability simply because an employee is so 
violent that their actions cannot be brought within a narrow definition of “acting in the 
course of employment”. 
Of more obvious relevance, perhaps, to a scenario arising from the activities of violent sports 
participants is the Court of Appeal’s decision in Mattis v Pollock [2003] IRLR 603.  Here, the 
claimant argued that Pollock, the owner of a nightclub, was vicariously liable for knife 
injuries inflicted by Cranston, a bouncer in Pollock’s employ.  Cranston had attacked several 
customers over a series of weekends, culminating in him assaulting one customer with a 
cosh and physically attacking at least two others on the night that Mattis was stabbed. 
Shortly before his attack on Mattis, Cranston had himself been assaulted by several of the 
club’s patrons.  He escaped without sustaining serious injury, went home and armed himself 
with a kitchen knife, before returning to the club in order to exact revenge on those who had 
attacked him.  The first person he encountered upon his return to the club was Mattis.  Just 
before stabbing him, Cranston said to Mattis, “I’ll teach you not to fuck with me”, a comment 
that the court of Appeal regarded as a clear reference to the incidents at the club earlier that 
evening (and which are discussed in more detail below).  Pollock was convicted of employing 
Cranston as an unregistered doorman, 14 while Cranston was convicted of causing grievous 
bodily harm with intent and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment.
13 See further James M, “Sports Participation and the Criminal Law” in Lewis A and Taylor J (eds), 
Sport: Law and Practice (Butterworths, London 2003) Ch E6.
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The first instance judgment reveals that Pollock was certainly aware of Cranston’s propensity 
for violence and was impressed by it.  Rather than reining in Cranston, he had encouraged 
him to use his physical prowess on several occasions.  On at least one occasion, a customer 
had tried to complain directly to Pollock, whom he knew and considered a friend, about 
Cranston’s thuggery.  Pollock had simply walked away.  Throughout the currency of the 
employment relationship Pollock had encouraged Cranston to manufacture violent 
confrontations in order to reinforce his “hard man” status.  The High Court transcript reveals 
that Pollock believed he needed someone with “a reputation” to compensate for a “weak 
door”; someone who could “sort out” “troublesome customers”.  His employment of 
Cranston was designed to generate a degree of fear on the part of the punters.  In spite of 
the overwhelming evidence of Pollock’s collusion in his employee’s violence, however, the 
judge at first instance held Pollock was not vicariously liable for the stabbing of Mattis.15
In June 2003 that decision was overturned on appeal on the grounds that the judgment 
could not be reconciled with those of the House of Lords in Lister and Dubai Aluminium v 
Salaam [2003] IRLR 608, although the judgment in the latter had not been available when 
Mattis was heard at first instance.  Giving the judgment of the court of Appeal, Judge LJ 
stated the “essence principle” to be derived from their Lordships’ decisions in those two 
cases was that:
Mr Pollock’s vicarious liability to Mr Mattis for Cranston’s attack requires a deceptively 
simple question to be answered.  Approaching the matter broadly, was the result so 
“closely connected” with what Mr Pollock authorised or expected of Cranston in the 
performance of his employment as doorman at his nightclub, that it would be fair and 
just to conclude that Mr Pollock is vicariously liable?16
 In answering that question in the affirmative, the Court of Appeal placed great emphasis on 
two closely related aspects of the case that had received scant coverage at first instance.  It 
was revealed that 40-year-old Mattis had actually played some role in the earlier 
disturbances.  He had fleetingly attempted to grab Cranston, a 6ft 9in former boxer weighing 
in at 20 stone, round the waist and pull him off his victim.  The Court of Appeal presciently 
noted that the “public humiliation” Cranston had sustained when he was attacked by several 
customers and forced to retreat had “wholly undermined his reputation and status as the 
doorman Pollock had expected him to be”.17 So far as the Court of Appeal was concerned, 
Cranston was intent on avenging the damage to his reputation and re-establishing himself 
as Pollock’s “enforcer”, and it was this aspect of the affair that rendered the incident so 
14 An offence under the London Local Authorities Act 1995 (UK), s 31.
15 Mattis v Pollock (t/as Flamingo’s Nightclub [2002] EWHC 2177.
16 Mattis v Pollock (t/as Flamingo’s Nightclub [2003] IRLR 603 at 605 per Judge LJ.
17 Mattis v Pollock (t/as Flamingo’s Nightclub [2003] IRLR 603 at 607 per Judge LJ.
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“closely connected” to the employment that vicarious liability should attach.  It is a 
judgment that accords perfectly with Lister and Dubai Aluminium and the court of Appeal’s 
righting of the wrong that had been committed by the judge at first instance in Mattis v 
Pollock is to be welcomed.   Although, as per Lord Clyde in Lister, it is possible that assaults 
resulting from “passion and resentment” or “personal spite” may still fall outside the scope 
of vicarious liability, it is a weak defence and one that the courts should be wary of affording 
to employers.  This is especially so in cases involving men like Cranston, whose sheer 
physicality is what makes them attractive to the employer in the first place.  As Hobbs et al 
illustrate, a bouncer who lacks the requisite physical capital18 - who cannot “deliver” when 
the threat of violence becomes the reality and is thus a stranger to “the dynamics of 
interpersonal violence”19 that is the bouncers’ demesne – is a liability to his employer and 
destined for a short career in a profession where reputation, status and “face” are the 
defining characteristics.  Not all bouncers are violent; but they must be able to use violence 
effectively when the occasion demands.  What can be said with certainty is that after Lister, 
Dubai Aluminium and Mattis it is now more difficult than ever for an employer to avoid 
responsibility for the violent actions of an employee, and especially so if the employee has a 
history of violence.
THE FUTURE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN SPORT
As discussed above, the vicarious liability cases that have involved sports incidents have all 
involved acts that are without question an integral part of the employment of the defendant 
player.  It would appear from the cases discussed hitherto that almost any act that could be 
claimed as being a part of the playing culture of a sport would be accepted as being an act 
in furtherance of the employment of the defendant, and one to which vicarious liability 
would accordingly attach.  However, what is open to conjecture, in the wake of Lister and 
Mattis, is how far the law could be taken as holding the employing club liable for acts of a 
player that go beyond those which accord with this “playing culture”.
The following scenarios examine how the English law on vicarious liability could apply to 
situations where sports participants rely upon their physical prowess to do their employer’s 
bidding by resorting to excessive violence.  First, one recent British incident is used as the 
basis for a hypothetical discussion of how the law could have been applied if the injured 
party had pursued legal action.  Second, three cases from different jurisdictions are analysed 
to ascertain whether the vicarious liability that was imposed abroad could ever be imposed if 
a similar situation arose under English law.
18 On which see Shilling C, “Educating the Body: Physical Capital and the Production of Social 
Inequalities” [1991] Sociology 653.
19 Hobbs D, Hadfield P, Lister S and Winlow S, Bouncers. Violence and Governance in the Night-time 
Economy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) p 3.
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A FEW HARD CASES
Roy Keane and Alf Inge Haaland
In the 2001 derby game between Manchester United Football Club and Manchester City 
Football Club at Old Trafford, the United captain, Roy Keane, made a challenge on City’s Alf 
Inge Haaland.20 The challenge, for which Keane was sent off and subsequently banned for 
four matches, seriously injured Haaland’s right knee.21 In the immediate aftermath of the 
match, rumours began to circulate that Keane had deliberately kicked Haaland, possibly 
even intending to injure him.  It was alleged that the challenge was motivated by revenge 
for an incident that had occurred the previous season between the two players, when 
Haaland was playing for Leeds United Football Club.22 On this previous occasion, Keane had 
stayed on the ground after the challenge because of damage to his cruciate ligaments and 
was accused by Haaland of feigning injury in an attempt to get him (Keane) sent off.  Despite 
some initial outcry at the time of the second challenge, the matter was considered closed 
when Keane was banned by the Football Association for the challenge.
In the summer of 2002, Keane published his autobiography.23 In it, he gave a more detailed 
account of what occurred in the 2001 game:
I’d waited almost 180 minutes for Alfie, three years if you looked at it another way. 
Now he had the ball on the far touchline.  Alfie was taking the piss, I’d waited long 
enough.  I fucking hit him hard.  The ball was there (I think).  Take that you cunt.  And 
don’t ever stand over me again sneering about fake injuries.  And tell your pal 
Wetherall there’s some for him as well.   I didn’t wait for Mr Elleray to show the card. 
I turned and walked to the dressing room.24
20 See further M James, “The Trouble with Roy Keane” (2002) 1 Entertainment Law 72.
21 The ban comprised three matches for the challenge on Haaland and an additional one match 
because this was his second sending-off of the season.
22 Manchester United Football Club v Leeds United Football Club, FA Carling Premier League game, 
Old Trafford, 14 September 1999.
23 Keane R and Dunphy E, Keane: The Autobiography (Michael Joseph, London 2002)
24 Keane and Dunphy, n 25, p 281.  The “Weatherall” referred to is David Wetherall, a team-mate of 
Haaland’s at Leeds when the first incident occurred.  “Mr Elleray” is David Elleray, the match referee. 
This passage has been removed from subsequent imprints of the book.
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Keane appeared to be admitting that the challenge on Haaland was deliberate, that it was 
intended to hurt Haaland and that it had been almost two years in the planning.  He 
appeared to have confessed to assaulting a fellow-player intentionally during the course of a 
game, that he had not cared whether or not the ball was either played or playable and that 
he knew that his challenge was an automatic sending-off offence.25
Before this “confession”, in terms of vicarious liability Keane’s challenge would have been 
considered to be little more than a poorly executed but authorised act carried out in the 
course of his employment as a professional footballer.  Had Haaland been in a position to 
sue, United, as Keane’s employer would have been vicariously liable for the injuries caused 
through a simple application of McCord.  Even though the specific challenge was a deliberate 
foul, it would have been simply an unauthorised mode, foul play, of carrying out an 
authorised act, a tackle.  Challenges that are made with more force than is necessary are an 
integral part of the playing of most contact sports and are consented to by the players.26 
Deliberate foul play has also been accepted by the courts as inherent in the playing of sports 
such as football.27 Thus, this would have been a relatively straightforward case of vicarious 
liability.
Once Keane appeared to confess to this being a deliberate and premeditated revenge 
attack, the issue of United’s vicarious liability became much more complex.  The judgment 
in Deatons v Flew (1949) 79 CLR 370 provided that “an act of passion and resentment” or “a 
spontaneous act of retributive justice” would be outside of the course of employment in such 
circumstances.  To paraphrase Dixon J, the occasion for administering the retributive act and 
the form it took may have arisen from the fact that he was a footballer but retribution was 
not within the course of his employment as a footballer.  In such circumstances, Manchester 
United would have had a strong argument that Keane was acting in a manner unconnected 
with his job as a professional footballer-employee and that it should not be vicariously liable 
for his actions in this case. 
Conversely, it could be argued that Keane was picked by United, at least in part, because of 
his aggressive and confrontational style of play.  This was one of the reasons why he was 
employed by the club: Roy Keane is one of football’s “hard men”.  His style of play was 
encouraged by the club through its coaching staff and the act could, following Lister, be 
considered to be an integral part of his employment even if carried out with an improper 
ulterior motive.  Manchester United have as much responsibility to recruit, train, supervise 
25 Haaland has not played a competitive match since.  Although the challenge injured his right knee, 
he claims that this exacerbated a pre-existing injury in his left knee.  It is his left knee that has required 
corrective surgery.
26 See further the discussions on this subject in Law Commission, Consent in the Criminal Law, 
Consultation Paper 139 (HMSO, London, 1995) at {12.7]-[12.31].
27 Elliott v Saunders and Liverpool Football Club (unreported, Eng High Ct, 10 June 1994).
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and, if necessary, take disciplinary action against its violent employees as did Hesley Hall 
Ltd.  A failure to do so could be seen as at least tacit encouragement of a violent style of 
play and therefore as acquiescing in an unauthorised manner of carrying out acts authorised 
as part of Keane’s professional duties.  Following Lister, Manchester United could have been 
vicariously liable for Keane’s actions.  Furthermore, the arguments for the extension of 
vicarious liability to cover situations such as Keane’s are perhaps strengthened by the fact 
that in at least three other jurisdictions, a similar chain of events has led to the imposition of 
liability upon the employer.
Canterbury Bankstown Rugby League Football Club Ltd v Rogers
Canterbury Bankstown Rugby Football League Club Ltd v Rogers; Bugden v Rogers [1993] 
Aust Tort Reports 81-246 arose out of an incident in a professional rugby league match in 
Australia, when the defendant was found to have intentionally struck the claimant with an 
outstretched forearm, whilst ostensibly making a legitimate tackle.  The challenge left the 
claimant with a broken jaw.  At trial, the judge held that the club was vicariously liable for 
the act of Bugden as this type of challenge was within the scope of his employment: it was 
an improper mode of performing an authorised act.  This was upheld on appeal.
The claimant put forward two further claims.  First he argued that the club should be 
vicariously liable for his injuries as they were inflicted by a specifically authorised act of the 
defendant coach.  This argument was based on a claim that the coach had deliberately 
“revved up” (sic) the players to such an extent that they were unable to control their 
aggression.  Second, it was argued that the coach then drew his players’ particular attention 
to three of the opposition players, including the claimant, who posed a particular threat to 
Canterbury’s chances of victory and had to be “stopped”.  The claimant took this to mean 
that he had been deliberately targeted and injured by the defendant as part of a specific in-
game strategy of Canterbury’s.
The New South Wales Court of Appeal accepted the first claim on the basis that the coach 
had negligently performed his duties in preparing the team for the game by encouraging 
them to play too aggressively.  However, the court rejected the latter claim on the basis of a 
lack of evidence.  The court held that there was no evidence of such a “hit list” or of a 
strategy that included deliberately injuring the claimant.  Instead, the court accepted that 
where the coach of a team had acted in the manner claimed here – that the players had 
been “psyched up” to such an extent that they had become violent – the club would be 
vicariously liable in negligence.  The employer accepted the risk of a coach performing such 
acts as this; playing “mind games” with one’s charges was an integral part of the coaching 
staff’s job and the club would be liable in respect of a coach who went too far. The court 
went on to add that if there had been evidence of a deliberate plan to cause injury to the 
claimant and others, the club would not only have been vicariously liable, but also liable for 
exemplary damages in the region of A$150,000.  That sum was around two and a half times 
the amount awarded as special and general damages.
Should such a case be heard before a British court, it is extremely likely that a similar result 
would be reached.  First, the club would be liable for the foul play of its player for the high 
tackle that caused the injury.  Unless the club could prove that a player was acting solely out 
of retribution28 (and a judge would be hard-pressed so to find on the facts), then this would 
again be an unauthorised mode, a foul high tackle, of conducting an authorised act, a tackle. 
However, even if revenge was the motive, then following Lister, it is still possible that the 
club would be vicariously liable for such an assault if it were considered integral to the tasks 
28 See Deatons v Flew (1949) 79 CLR 370.
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relevant to the employment.  Likewise, the club would be vicariously liable for the actions of 
the coach when he made his incautious overtures to the players in the pre-match warm up. 
This can be considered to be merely an overly enthusiastic manner of carrying out the 
activity that he was employed to carry out – to prepare the side to play first-grade rugby 
league.
However, difficulties arise with this judgment because of the judge’s comments that the club 
would have been vicariously liable for both player and coach had it been found that there 
was a “hit list” in place.  Considering that the court held the player personally liable for 
A$8,000 because of the deliberateness of his actions, it seems strange that the Court of 
Appeal would have held the club liable for the injuries caused had a hit list been found to 
have been in operation.  There are two possible and alternative lines of argument here. 
First, that there can be no vicarious liability of the club as the acts of the player would be 
analogous to acts of retributive justice, as in Deatons.  The pre-planned attack of another 
player is so unconnected, or perhaps should be so unconnected, with the normal playing of 
the game that no employer would ever countenance it as a legitimate or acceptable tactic. 
However, a strategy designed to cause injury to opposing star players is still in furtherance 
of the employer’s goals, which can be stated simply as being to win matches, and such a 
scenario is not far removed from Pollock’s rationale for employing the thuggish Cranston. 
This would make a tactic such as having a hit list of opposing players who should be taken 
out by physical play or intimidation an unauthorised mode of carrying out an unathorised 
act.  Such a claim would be extremely difficult to prove either way and would be entirely 
dependent on the evidence available.  The action would require evidence from one of the 
defendant club’s other employee-players who were aware of the existence of the hit list to 
enable the court to determine the legality of the particular strategy used.  This is unlikely to 
be forthcoming, if for no other reason than players placed in such a situation are unlikely to 
give evidence against their own coach or team-mates – unless the player is an ex-player 
with a grudge of his own, and in that case the court would have to decide how much weight 
to give his evidence.  However, where a club has a reputation for rough or intimidating 
physical play, under Lister there is a strong case for arguing that such acts are an integral 
part of the employment relationship.
Tomjanovich v California Sports Inc
In the United States, it has proved possible to establish vicarious liability against a club for 
even the most extreme actions of the employee-player.  Tomjanovich v California Sports Inc 
H-78-243 (SD Tx 1979) arose out of one of the most notorious acts of violence ever 
witnessed in the American National Basketball Association.  The claimant was punched in 
the face whilst running at full speed by Kermit Washington, an employee-player of the Los 
Angeles Lakers, who were owned by the defendant company.  Tomjanovich suffered fractures 
of the face and skull, a broken nose and separated upper jaw, a cerebral concussion and 
severe lacerations around his mouth.  In effect, the bone structure of his face was knocked 
loose from his skull.29
The defendant employer was found vicariously liable for, inter alia, the negligent supervision 
of its employee-player by failing adequately to control, train and discipline him.  As 
Washington had been specifically hired by the defendant/LA Lakers to fill the role of 
“enforcer” on the court, it was known to them in advance that he had a predisposition to this 
kind of violence.  This was one of the reasons he had been hired by the club.  Because of its 
knowledge of his style of play and his potential for violent conduct, when Washington 
29 Kirkpatrick C, “Shattered and Shaken”: see 
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/features/flashback/cuw/washington viewed 13 September 2004.
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assaulted Tomjanovich, the club was liable directly in negligence for the injuries caused and 
vicariously on the basis that his acts were authorised by the club as being part of its overall 
playing strategy.  The claimant was awarded US$3.2m in compensation, including US£1.5m 
of punitive damages.
The distinction between Rogers and Tomjanovich appears to be in the degree of the 
employer’s knowledge of the employee’s behavior, or at least the potential for a specific 
type of behavior.  Where the club knows of a player’s propensity to violent or aggressive 
play, and either buys him for that reason or continues to pick him despite his playing in that 
manner, then vicarious liability should attach.  However, where the employee is acting 
without the employer-club being aware of the dangerous nature of the strategies being 
developed, then perhaps the club may escape liability.  This is an interpretation that falls 
squarely within the scope of the law on vicarious liability post-Lister but, again, one must 
emphasis the precarious position of an employer in the latter scenario even where there is 
no actual knowledge of the propensity for violence that is being displayed.
Applying Lister to the Tomjanovich scenario, the club would be liable for the violent acts of 
the defendant.  This is despite claims in R v Billinghurst [1978] Crim LR 553 that punching 
could not be consented to as being an integral or inherent part of participation in rugby 
union matches, making it even less likely that the courts would consider punching an 
opponent to be a part of professional basketball.  The rationale for such a position would be 
based upon the act of punching an opponent being so intimately connected with the normal 
employment relationship between player and club, because the club is aware of the player’s 
propensity for violence, that the punch is considered to be an authorised act.  The act is 
authorised because the club knew of Washington’s style of play in advance and employed 
him for that reason.  It cannot then claim that his actions were unexpected or unwanted.
X v Club Rugby de Aureilhan
In France, the law has been developing in a similar manner to English law.  In X v Club Rugby 
de Aureilhan (Cour de Cassation 3/2/2000),30 during a regional rugby union match, the 
claimant was punched, off the ball, by a member of the opposing Aureilhan ASCA club.  The 
claimant brought an action in tort against ASCA on the basis of vicarious liability for the 
damage caused to his eye by the punch.  The French Supreme Court, the Cour de Cassation, 
held that under Art 1384(1), the objective of a sporting association, such as a sports club 
was to organise, direct and supervise the actions of its members.  If any of the club’s 
members caused injury to another during a sporting competition, then the club would be 
liable for the injuries caused.  Consequently, the Cour de Cassation upheld the Pau Cour 
d’Appel’s judgment for the claimant.
This method of imposing liability has not been without controversy in France but the 
correctness of the outcome is not disputed.  It has been argued that Art 1384(1) is not 
appropriate for imposing vicarious liability in situations like this but only for injury caused by 
“dangerous persons”.31 As the actions of sports participants were not envisaged by the 
legislature as being those of dangerous persons and because sports clubs do not have such 
30 Decision reported in La Semaine Juridque – Edition Generale 22/3/2000 p 550; see also Cairns W, 
“Sports Law Current Survey” (2000) 8 Sport and the Law Journal 2 at 23.
31 Denoix De Saint-Marcs, “La responsibilite des clubs de rugby fondee sur l’article 1384, alinea 1 er, 
du code civil; le maintien d’une solution contestable” [2000] Le Dalloz 862; Cairns W, “Sports Law 
Current Survey” (2001) 9 Sport and the Law Journal 2 at 32.
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a high degree of control over their playing members as found by the court, the cause of 
action should not have been grounded in Art 1384(1) but in Art 1384(5), which justifies a 
finding of vicarious liability of the employer club through the contract of employment.  On 
this basis, the employer is responsible for the injury-causing actions of its employees.  In 
French law, this theory can be extended to amateur players who are not employed to play 
by the club on the basis of their subordination to the rules and directives of the club through, 
for example, its coach.  The concept of being responsible for a “dangerous person” under Art 
1384(1) may instead be more relevant to cases where the defendant-player has a known 
reputation for violence, as in the examples above, instead of for a single act of violence by a 
player.
This case raises two interesting issues.  First, if this case had occurred in England, vicarious 
liability could not have been raised as there was no contract of employment in place.  In 
Vowles, the claimant had originally joined as defendants the captain, coach and directors of 
his club and the club itself.  These claims were dropped variously because of the lack of a 
contractual nexus between the claimant and the club and on the basis of there not being a 
sufficient amount of control of any of the players’ actions by the club’s officers.  French law 
would appear to allow a way around this problem by holding that amateur sports clubs have 
a degree of control over the on-field behavior of their player-members similar to that of a 
professional club.
Second the test used by the Cour de Cassation is strikingly similar to that used in English 
law.  French law finds the club responsible because the club is under a duty to organise, 
control and supervise the actions of its players.  English law imposes liability because the 
employer-club is under a duty to train, supervise and discipline its players.  Perhaps the 
development that English law should be contemplating incorporating from French law is that 
an amateur club should be as responsible for the actions of its violent players as a 
professional club.
CONCLUSIONS
Given the recent development of what may be called “sports torts”, and the number of 
cases that have arisen since Condon v Basi, there is every likelihood that, in the fullness of 
time, the courts of England and Wales will be required to consider whether the law as it 
applies in non-sporting situations is to be applied without gloss to injury-causing incidents 
arising out of sport.  The authors’ contention is that it should be.  Employers who expect and 
encourage their staff members to use their physicality to further their business interests 
should have no hiding-place in the event of such an employee going “over the top”.  If 
similar scenarios to those discussed above were to come before the courts of England and 
Wales, there is no reason why Lister would not be applied to the clubs or their respective 
holding companies and they would be found vicariously liable for the acts of their players. 
The connection between the employment relationship and the injury-causing act is 
sufficiently close.  So much so that unless the club could argue that the assaults formed part 
of a personal vendetta unconnected to the employment relationship (which may have been 
a viable defence in Keane’s case), then the clubs would be liable for the extreme actions of 
players who have a history of violence.
Most professional sporting organizations would not want to, or even be able to, meet a 
vicarious liability claim such as those discussed above, where potentially many millions of 
pounds of damages are at stake.32 On purely pragmatic grounds, clubs would be reluctant to 
blame their players in this way because few players would ever want to play for them again. 
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Coupled with the obvious reluctance of team-mates to give evidence against one another, it 
is unlikely that clubs would want to argue cases along these lines too often.  However, where 
insurance companies are involved, there will be competing concerns.  Clubs may have little 
choice other than to disavow the acts of their players in the hope of avoiding a potentially 
crippling damages claim against them, particularly as insurance is unlikely to extend to 
cover deliberate acts such as those discussed.
An alternative scenario presents itself in the wake of Caldwell v Maguire (2002) PIQR 6.  Here 
the Court of Appeal approved the use of particular criteria to determine whether liability in 
negligence ought to attach in a case arising out of a sporting activity.  The Court of Appeal 
recommended (at 10) that a test based on the following five propositions be used when 
determining liability in sports negligence cases:
1. Each contestant in a lawful sporting contest owes a duty of care to each and all other 
contestants. 
2. That duty is to exercises all care that is objectively reasonable in the prevailing 
circumstances for the avoidance of infliction of injury to such fellow contestants.
3. The prevailing circumstances include its object, the demands made upon its 
contestants, its inherent dangers, its rules, conventions and customs, and the 
standards, skills and judgment reasonably to be expected of a contestant.
4. Given the nature of the circumstances outlined above, the threshold for liability is in 
practice inevitably high – proof of a mere error of judgment or momentary lapse of 
skill and care will not be enough in itself to establish a breach of duty.
5. In practice, it may be difficult to prove a breach of duty unless there is proof of 
conduct amounting to reckless disregard for a fellow contestant’s safety.
The third and fourth propositions above detail for the first time the specific circumstances 
that should be considered to be relevant when determining liability in sports negligence 
cases.  By defining the playing culture of the sport in this way,33 the court has ensured that 
liability will be determined in accordance with the game as it is actually played by 
participants of the sport at that level instead of by the absolute standard of the rules of the 
game, which are relegated to being of evidential value only.  This test has the added 
advantage of removing from the scope of liability commonly occurring acts of foul play that 
are, for the most part, not injury-causing.  Although, perhaps, this allows for an 
interpretation of the way that a sport is played that is not in accordance with old-fashioned 
notions of fair play, it is a pragmatic approach that allows governing bodies to maintain 
direct control over the dynamics of the way their sport is played but leaves the law with the 
role of ensuring that violence does not become endemic within them.
The Court of Appeal’s support for this approach implicitly encourages the courts, when 
dealing with other aspects of sporting negligence in subsequent cases, to produce similar 
32 By way of illustration, damages of £1.8 million were awarded against the Welsh Rugby Football 
Union in Vowles; their personal accident insurance only provided cover in the sum of £1 million.
33 See further Gardiner S et al, Sports Law (3rd ed, Cavendish Publishing, London, 2004) Ch 16.
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guidelines that may “assist” in the disposal of such cases.  In the long term there may be 
cases in which the application of tort law to sports cases is constrained by guidance that, for 
example, limits the scope of vicarious liability or locates the application of volenti within a 
sport-specific framework.  By developing the concept of playing culture in Caldwell, a further 
rule could be developed for vicarious liability cases.  This would ensure that employer clubs 
are liable for any acts that are negligent according to the Caldwell criteria and would clarify 
which acts that are outside of the playing culture of a sport must still be considered to be 
acts that are authorised by the defendant club for the purposes of vicarious liability.
A further alternative presents itself in the form of a potential action against the governing 
body of a sport for injuries caused to participants playing the game that it oversees.  By 
developing the Caldwell criteria and the discussions of liability from Watson, an action could 
be brought in negligence against a governing body for its failure to provide a reasonably 
safe system of work for those who play the game it governs.  This could be based on either a 
failure of the governing body to apply or develop appropriate safety rules to protect the 
players from in-game injuries, or through a failure to operate a disciplinary process that 
punishes players sufficiently to act as a reasonable deterrent.  This incremental extension of 
the reasoning in Caldwell and Watson, particularly the latter case where it was held that one 
of the reasons for having a governing body was to protect the safety of the participants, 
could provide a further opportunity for a claimant to recover damages for sports injuries.  If 
either approach were to occur, one could truly say that “sports law” has emerged as a 
discrete area of English law.
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